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Abstract— File distribution is becoming a key technology, in
particular in large scale content broadcasting systems like DVB-
H/SH. They largely rely on Application Level FEC codes (AL-
FEC) in order to recover from transmission erasures. We believe
that sooner or later, content integrity and source authentication
security services will be required in these systems. In order to
save the client terminal resources, which can be a handheld au-
tonomous device, we have designed a hybrid system that merges
the AL-FEC decoding and content integrity/source authentication
services. More precisely our system can detect a random object
corruption triggered by a deliberate attack with a probability
close to 100% almost for free in terms of computation overhead.
I. I NTRODUCTION
a) File distribution and AL-FEC:File/object distribution
is becoming a key technology, in particular in large scale
content broadcasting systems like DVB-H/SH. They largely
rely on Application Level Forward Erasure Correction codes
(AL-FEC), not only to recover from transmission erasures but
also to improve the content broadcasting scheme itself (e.g. the
FLUTE/ALC protocol stack of DVB-H/SH). More specifically,
AL-FEC codes work over apacket erasure channel, where
packets either arrive without any error or are lost. Packet
erasures can result from transmission errors (that exceed the
error correcting capabilities of the physical layer codes), or
congestion problems within an IP router, or simply because
the receiver is a mobile device that is currently disconnected.
If the patented Raptor AL-FEC codes[7] are well suited to
broadcasting systems (they are part of the 3GPP and DVB
standards), LDPC codes form an interesting alternative.
b) The LDPC-Staircase AL-FEC Codes:The LDPC-
staircase codes [8] (also called double-diagonal or repeat
accumulate codes) are particularly interesting for file delivery
systems. Thanks to their parity check matrix structure these
codes feature a high encoding/decoding speed, which means
they can easily encode in a single pass objects that are
composed of a huge number of source symbols (typically
several 10,000s). This is a great advantage when compared to
small block codes like Reed-Solomon codes[11]. Besides these
codes have been standardized at IETF as RFC 5170 [12] and a
high performance on-the-shelf GNU/LGPL codec is available
[10]. For all these reasons they are used in this work. Note that
in the following we consider that symbols (AL-FEC coding
point of view) are equivalent to packets (network point of
view) since (usually) a symbol is carried in a single packet.
Symbols can therefore be several hundreds of bytes long.
Several decoding techniques are possible. Iterative decoding
is a usual, high performance technique [12]: given a set
of linear equations, if one of them has only one remaining
unknown variable, then the value of this variable is that of
the constant term. So, this variable is replaced by its value
in all the remaining equations and we reiterate. The value of
several variables can therefore be found recursively. Applied
to LDPC AL-FEC codes, the parity check matrix defines a set
of linear equations whose variables are the source symbols and
parity symbols. Receiving or decoding a symbol is equivalent
to finding the value of a variable. When the decoding succeeds
with this algorithm, all the source and parity symbols are
received or rebuilt. This paper does not detail LDPC-staircase
and interested readers can refer to [11][12].
c) Adding Content Integrity/Source Authentication Ser-
vices: Within closed networks (e.g. DVB-H infrastructure),
launching a DoS attack or injecting spurious traffic requires an
expensive equipment, which limits the risks. But the situaton
is opposite in case of open networks, like the Internet or Wifi
hotspots. Here the content integrity and source authentication
services are often required to enable a receiver to check that
what he received is actually the content that has been sent by
the authorized sender.
These integrity/source verifications can be made either on a
per-packet or per-object basis. This work focuses on the latt r
case. The traditional solution consists in signing a hash oft e
object with an asymmetric cryptographic function. In that cse,
with big objects, the computation time of the signature is low
compared to the hash calculation over the object, especially
with modern strengthened hash functions. This is theref rence
solutionagainst which we will compare our scheme.
d) Goals of this Work:Our work explores an alternative
solution that consists in adding object verification capabilities
to an existing FEC schemewhile minimizing the computation
and transmission overheads. The resulting system, called
VeriFEC, must be able to:
• detect the vast majority of corrupted objects with a
reduced cost (i.e. enable a lightweight pre-check),
• detect all the corrupted objects with a cost close to
standard integrity check (i.e. during full check),
• and keep exactly the same erasure recovery capabilities
as the original AL-FEC scheme.
The corruption can be either intentional (i.e. mounted by
an attacker) or not (e.g. caused by transmission errors that
have not been detected/corrected by the physical layer FEC
codes/CRC). In this work we first consider the case ofrandom
corruptions, and then we considerintelligent attacks.
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II. PROBLEM ANALYSIS AND OBSERVATIONS
This section introduces the attack model and the corruption
propagation phenomenon that is the core of our proposal. Then
it discusses the potential use of this phenomenon, both from
the attacker and the receiver points of view.
A. The Attack Model
Let us consider an unsecured transmission channel. We
first assume the attacker can corrupt an unlimited number of
symbols randomly chosen (which includes the cases of errors
not detected by the lower layers and attackers with limited
capabilities). In a second step (section V) we will consider
the case of intelligent attacks mounted by powerful attackers.
A first goal for the attacker can be tocorrupt the object
without the receiver’s noticing. This corruption is anyway
detected by the use of cryptographic hash over the whole
object, and the detection probability is only limited by the
robustness of the hash function itself against malicious attacks.
Another goal for the attacker can be to mount aDenial of
Service (DoS) attack, either by sending a large number of
fake objects that will be received in addition to the legitimate
objects or simply by corrupting as many objects as possible.
This attack is trivial to launch. The challenge for the receiver
is to quickly identify corrupted objects and get rid of them
with the lowest possible computational overhead.
This work essentially focuses on the second type of attack,
where the attacker tries to consume the receiver resources.
B. The Corruption Propagation Phenomenon
1) The Phenomenon:In order to recover from erasures, the
iterative decoder rebuilds the missing symbols thanks to the
received ones. Let us consider the following equation (one of
the constraint equations defined by the LDPC parity check
matrix): S0 ⊕ S1 ⊕ S2 ⊕ S3 = 0.
We assume that the valuess1, s2, s3 of these symbols have
been received, but nots0. Then: s0 = s1 ⊕ s2 ⊕ s3. If S3
has been corrupted ins′3 = s3 ⊕ ε, whereas the other symbols
have been correctly received. ThenS0 is decoded as:
s1 ⊕ s2 ⊕ s
′
3 = s1 ⊕ s2 ⊕ s3 ⊕ ε = s0 ⊕ ε = s
′
0
S0 has inherited the corruption ofS3. Therefore, if a corrupted
symbol is used during decoding, the decoded symbol inherits
from the corruption. Furthermore, each newly decoded symbol
can be used to decode other symbols recursively, and a cor-
ruption avalanche can take place. We call this thecorruption
propagation phenomenon.
2) Codeword Interpretation:This phenomenon can also be
seen from a ”codeword” point of view. Let us remind that,
in the context of AL-FEC codes, a codeword is the vector
formed by all the bits of a certain position in the set of
source and parity symbols. The output of FEC decoding is
always a codeword and this decoded codeword,w, satisfies
the conditionHw = 0, whereH is the LDPC parity check
matrix. In our case, symbols are several hundreds of bits long,
says, which means that the set of source and parity symbols
form s codewords, each of them satisfying the above relation.
Said differently, LDPC decoding at the symbol level consists
of s parallel LDPC decoding at the bit level (codeword), all
of them sharing the same erasure pattern.
Let assume that the transmitted codewordw has been
corrupted. The output of the decoder is necessarily another
codeword,w′ (w 6= w′). Since we are dealing with linear
codes, the difference of two codewords is also a codeword, and
in particulare = w−w′. Therefore a successful corruption can
b seen as the addition of a codeworde (called thecorrupting
codeword) to the transmitted codewordw.
3) Experimental Approach:In order to quantify this phe-
nomenon, we carried out experiments using the on-the-shelf
LDPC-staircase C++ reference codec [10]. We chose an object
composed of20, 000 symbols1, and used a coding rateR =
k/n = 2/3 (i.e. n − k = 10, 000 parity symbols are added).
Symbols are transmitted in a random order in order (1) to carry
out experiments without considering the channel loss model,
and (2) to be sure that decoding operations will take place2.
The attacker randomly chooses some symbols and corrupts
them. We then count the number of corruptedsourcesymbols
after decoding3. The test is repeated 2,000 times for each value
and we plot the min/average/max/90% confidence intervals.
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Fig. 1. Number of corrupted source symbols after decoding (aver-
age/min/max/90 % confidence interval) W.R.T. the number of corrupted
symbols received.
Figure 1 shows that even a single corruption triggers on
average more than 700 corrupted symbols after decoding (i.e.,
3.5% of the object). However some experiments exhibit few
symbol corruptions, which means that the symbols corrupted
by the attacker have been used to rebuild only a small number
of symbols. In some tests there is no corrupted symbol at
all after decoding, which means that the symbols corrupted
by the attacker were symbols that have not been used during
decoding (e.g., because this symbol has already been rebuilt).
C. First Conclusions
1) For the Attacker:For the attacker, a massive corruption
of the object can be achieved with only a limited attack over
1The size of each symbol has no impact and is not specified.
2 Note that if the transmission order is not sufficiently random,a receiver
can easily randomize the order in which the received symbols are given to
the decoder, without requiring additional buffering sinceth target use-case
(i.e. FLUTE/ALC) requires large buffering capabilities anyway.
3 Note that we do not take into account the number of corruptedarity
symbols after decoding since the ultimate goal of the attackeris to corrupt
the object, not the temporary parity symbols.
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the transmitted packets (a single symbol is often sufficient),
which can be the attacker target. However, the attacker will
usually have difficulties to create a limited targeted corruption.
This is not totally impossible though, but it remains excep-
tional. This latter aspect will be detailed in section V.
2) For the Receiver:The receiver can regard the important
corruption propagation phenomenon as either as a problem
(e.g., a corrupted video will exhibit many glitches) or as
an advantage (detecting a corruption is easier). In our case,
VeriFEC heavily relies on this phenomenon.
III. O UR SOLUTION: VERIFEC
A. Principles
The idea is to take advantage of the propagation phe-
nomenon by using an integrity verification of the decoded
object in two steps. First a low cost preliminary check detects
the vast majority of corrupted objects, and if the preliminary
check does not detect anything, a complementary check is used
to obtain a 100% detection probability4.
The preliminary check consists in verifying only a subset of
the source symbols after AL-FEC decoding (figure 2). Thanks
to the corruption propagation phenomenon, we know that most
random attacks (even on a single symbol, the worst case)
will trigger many corruptions in the decoded object. Since we
only check a subset of the object, the preliminary verification
cannot reach a 100% detection probability, but we will show
in section IV that in practice the vast majority of attacks are
detected. The second check consists in verifying the remaining
source symbols. Therefore, an object that successfully passed
the two checks is certified 100% sure.
Fig. 2. VeriFEC preliminary versus complementary integrity verification.
Fig. 3. VeriFEC global view.
In this paper we only consider a single receiver. However
VeriFEC does not include any mechanism that would limit its
field of application, and since there is no information sent by
the receiver(s) to the sender, VeriFEC is massively scalable.
4This probability is in fact only limited by that of the hash function.
B. Details
1) Sender Side:The sender performs FEC encoding and
sends the source and parity symbols as usual. In parallel
he randomly selects a subsetV of Nverif source symbols,
by using a pseudo-random number generator and a seed,
prel verif seed. Let V denote the complementary subset, equal
to the source symbols that are not inV . Then he computes
the hash overV , calledprel hash, and the hash overV , called
complhash. The {prel verif seed; prelhash; complhash}
triple is then sent to the receiver. Since the security of this
triple is crucial, the sender digitally signs it [9] so that the
receiver can check its integrity and authenticate the sender
(we assume the receiver knows the sender’s public key, e.g.
thanks to a PKI). The signed triple can be sent in-band (using
the unsecured channel) or out-of-band (e.g. in a web page).
Sometimes a secure channel exists over which the triple can
be transmitted. This is not expected to be the usual solution
since it does not scale.
2) Receiver Side:The receiver proceeds to a standard AL-
FEC decoding of the object, using the received symbols. In
parallel the receiver retrieves the{prel verif seed; prelhash;
complhash} triple and checks the digital signature. Thanks
to this check, the sender is also authenticated. The receiver
then proceeds to a two step object integrity verification:
thanks to the receivedprel verif seed,the receiver selects the
same subsetV of source symbols, computes the hash of this
subset and compares it to the receivedprel hash. If the two
hashes differ, the receiver has detected for sure a corruption.
Otherwise the receiver cannot conclude yet. Then he compares
the hash of the complementary subsetV to the received
complhash. If the two hashes differ, the receiver knows for
sure the object has been corrupted, otherwise he knows for
sure the object is not corrupted.
IV. PERFORMANCEEVALUATION WITH RANDOM ATTACKS
We have designed a VeriFEC class that derives from the
underlying LDPCFecSession class of the LDPC-staircase C++
open source codec version 2.0 [10]. We use OpenSSL version
0.9.8c for the cryptographic primitives. More precisely digital
signatures use RSA-1024 and the message digest is one of
MD5 (banned from secure systems), RIPEMD-160 [4], SHA-
1, and SHA-256.
We carried out experiments meant to appreciate the VeriFEC
preliminary verification performances in terms of corruption
detection capabilities and processing overhead. The same
configuration as that of section II-B.3 is used: the object is
composed ofk = 20, 000 symbols (except in section IV-C),
and the coding rate is equal toR = 2/3 (except in sec-
tion IV-C). We assume that the attacker does not want to
be detected by the preliminary check and therefore corrupts
a single symbol. We also assume that the attacker chooses
the corrupted symbol randomly (intelligent attacks will be
addressed in section V).
A. Dependency W.R.T. the Verification Ratio
We first study the numberNverif of source symbols that
must be verified (i.e. the number of symbols inV ) in order
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to reach the desired corruption detection probability with
the preliminary check. The higher theNverif value, the
higher the corruption detection probability (a full detection
is achieved whenNverif equalsk). However we also want
to keep the processing overhead of the preliminary check to
a minimum, and from this point of viewNverif should be
as small as possible. In order to find an appropriate value, we
carried out experiments where, for each verification ratio value
(i.e. Nverif/k ratio), we calculate the percentage corruptions
detected over50, 000 tests.
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Fig. 4. Corruption detection probability of the preliminarycheck as a function
of the verification ratio,Nverif /k.
As expected figure 4 shows that the detection probability
increases withNverif . But we also see that checking only
1% of the decoded object already enables to detect 99.22%
of the attacks. We believe thatverifying 5% of the symbols
to achieve a corruption detection probability of 99.86% is a
good balance between detection and computation overhead.
This ratio will be used for the rest of the paper.
B. Computing Overhead Gains
Since the verification ratio is now set to 5%, we can
study the computing gains made possible by the preliminary
check as well as the global (two step) VeriFEC overhead with
respect to the reference solution (i.e. standard FEC codec and
signed hash over the entire object). To that purpose, we have
measured the various times at a receiver with different hash
systems, and we have calculated the average values over 200
runs. The experiments are carried out on a Dual-Core Intel
Xeon 5120 processor, 1.86 GHz/4 GB RAM/Linux host. The
symbol size is set to 1024 bytes, which means that we are
dealing with 20 MB objects, adding 10 MB of parity data.
1) Preliminary Check Only:The first scenario corresponds
to the case where the object is corrupted and the preliminary
check detects this corruption (this is the most probable cas).
Table I compares the cost of the standard solution to the
cost of VeriFEC with the preliminary verification only, by
showing their processing times and corresponding bitrates. W
see that the relative gains are very significant, especiallywith
modern, strengthened message digest algorithms, that incur a
significant processing load. With SHA-256, the relative gains
for FEC decoding/hash verification made possible by VeriFEC
amounts to59.2△% (even with SHA-1, this gain is significant,
31.7△%). If we focus only on the verification process, we
MD5 RIPEMD-160 SHA-1 SHA-256
Receiver: bitrate
FEC+signed hash (s) 651 Mb/s 473 Mb/s 586 Mb/s 337 Mb/s
VeriFEC (s) 865 Mb/s 861 Mb/s 858 Mb/s 828 Mb/s
Relative gain (△%) 24.7△% 45.1△% 31.7△% 59.2△%
Receiver: verification time only
Signed hash verif. (s) 0.0657 s 0.1646 s 0.0937 s 0.3032 s
VeriFEC verif. (s) 0.0037 s 0.0086 s 0.0051 s 0.0157 s
Relative gain (△%) 94.4△% 94.8△% 94.6△% 94.8△%
TABLE I
BITRATE AND PROCESSING TIMES OFVERIFEC’S PRELIMINARY CHECK
VERSUS THE STANDARDFEC+SIGNED HASH SCHEME.
observe that VeriFEC reduces the overhead by94, 8△%,
which is in line with the theoretical 95% improvement (since
we only check 5% of the symbols).
2) Complete verification:The second scenario is when
the preliminary verification has not detected any corruption,
meaning that either the object is not corrupted or that the
preliminary check failed to spot the corruption. The cost of
the standard solution is compared to the cost of VeriFEC when
both preliminary and complementary verifications are done.
Standard VeriFEC overhead
(FEC+hash) (prel+compl hash)
SENDER FEC + hash
creation time 0.2946 s 0.2975 s 0.98△%
RECEIVER FEC +
verification time 0.3880 s 0.3911 s 0.80△%
RECEIVER verif.
time only 0.1724 s 0.1753 s 1.68△%
TABLE II
TOTAL PROCESSING TIME OFVERIFEC VERSUS THE STANDARD
FEC+SIGNED HASH SCHEME.
We can expect a little computation overhead because the
data chunks given to the message digest function during the
two verifications are not necessarily contiguous. We measurd
it, using the RIPEMD-160 hash function. Table II shows that
this overhead remains small,1.68△% (if we only consider the
hash verification time).
3) Computing Overhead Gains W.R.T. the Object Corrup-
tion Ratio: We now appreciate the benefits of VeriFEC as a
function of the object corruption ratio (i.e. the ratio of objects
corrupted by an attacker). The computation cost is fixed in
case of a standard ”FEC plus complete hash” solution. On the
opposite, this verification cost varies a lot with VeriFEC. If
very few objects are corrupted, the (costly) complementary
check is almost always performed. On the opposite, if a
large number of objects are corrupted, then most corruptions
are identified by the (cheap) preliminary verification, thereby
saving processing time.
Let us introduce some notations:
• TV erif : average time spent to verify the object,
• TPre V erif : preliminary verification time,
• TCompl V erif : complementary hash verification time,
• PObject Corruption: object corruption ratio,
• PPre V erif Detection: preliminary verification corruption
detection probability.
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With the VeriFEC system, the average verification time as a
function of the object corruption ratio is given by:
TV erif = TPreliminary V erif + TCompl V erif × (1 −
PObject Corruption × PPartial Hash Detection)
We use PPre V erif Detection = 0.9986 (section IV-A).
We have experimentally measured the other parameters
and, with RIPEMD-160, we found that on average:
TPreliminary V erif = 0.0091s andTCompl V erif = 0.1662s.
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Fig. 5. Verification time as a function of the object corruption ratio.
Figure 5 shows the two curves for each solutions, not
including the FEC decoding time (identical in both cases).
We see that if there is no corruption, our system adds a little
overhead. This overhead becomes null when the corruption
ratio is 1.3%. Then, the higher the corruption ratio, the more
effective our system is.
C. Dependency W.R.T. the Object Size and FEC Coding Rate
We now analyze the influence of both the object size (in
terms of the number source symbols, regardless of the symbol
size which has no influence) and the FEC coding rate on the
corruption detection probability. Since these two parameters
were fixed in the previous experiments, we now want to make
sure that the VeriFEC efficiency remains good for different
object sizes and coding rates.
Concerning the object size, experiments reported in [3]
show that the detection probability quickly increases with
the object size. With objects containing 4000 symbols, the
corruption detection probability of the preliminary verification
already amounts to 98.75%. So the VeriFEC system matches
well the operational conditions of the underlying LDPC-
staircase codes since theselarge block AL-FEC codes are
known to perform well when the number of symbols exceeds
a few thousands [11].
Concerning the coding rate, experiments reported in [3]
show that the detection probability of the preliminary verifica-
tion remains fairly stable (between 99.53% to 99.90%), even
when the coding rate largely varies, between0.33 and 0.91.
Note that using coding rates below0.33 is not recommended
with LDPC-staircase [11].
We can therefore conclude that the object size and coding
rate parameters do not impact the VeriFEC efficiency.
V. ON INTELLIGENT ATTACKS
In this section, we consider the case of an intelligent and
powerful attacker. As the main benefit of VeriFEC is the
high detection probability of the preliminary verification, we
will only consider attacks that significantly reduce it, i.e.
that lead to a non detection probability higher than1, 4.10−3
(section IV-A). Note that in any case, all attacks will finally
be detected after the complementary check.
A. Preventing Simple Intelligent Attacks by Extending theV
Subset of Verified Symbols
Let us first assume that the LDPC code is known by the
attacker (the{k, n, seed} triple is transmitted in clear text
by default and fully defines the LDPC code [12]). In that
case verifying only a subset of the source symbols during the
preliminary check is no longer sufficient. Indeed an intellig nt
attacker can choose a corrupting codeword with only one ’1’
in the source bits. To find it, the attacker just needs to FEC
encode the source bit vector (since he knows the code), and
retrieve the associated parity bits (of course, there are many
’1’ in the parity bits in that case). Then the attacker adds thi
codeword to the received symbols and forwards the resulting
symbols to the receiver5. The detection probability is then
equal toNverif/k, i.e. the verification ratio.
One counter measure is tochose the verified subsetV over
all the source and parity symbols. However,the complemen-
tary subsetV remains the sameand only encompasses source
symbols. A consequence is that the receiver needs to rebuild
the repair symbols ofV . In fact, the iterative algorithm already
rebuilds a large majority of the parity symbols, if not all, so
this overhead can be neglected.
Another counter measure is to hide the LDPC code. This
technique will be fully described in section V-B.3.
B. Preventing Low Weight Codeword Attacks
We now describe another attack using so called ”Low
Weight Codewords” (LWC) and we introduce counter mea-
sures.
1) The Need for Low Weight Codewords:For convenience,
and without loss of generality, let us focus on one of thes
codewords (we assume the attacker has received all then
symbols, and therefore knows the correspondings codewords).
Let SS() be the function that selects the subset ofNverif bits,
at the positions selected for theV subset, in the codeword.
A corruption of w is not detected if the attacker creates a
codewordw′ 6= w such thatSS(w′) = SS(w)6. Knowing the
verified subset and finding a codeword having null bits in the
verified subset is therefore sufficient to launch a successful
attack for the preliminary verification.
A trivial counter measure is to hide the verified subset
from the attacker. This can be done by one of the following
techniques: sending theprel verif seedon a secure channel,
5 Of course the attacker hass possible ways to add the corruption codeword
to the original symbols,s being the symbol size in bits. This is not an issue.
6We assume that hash function is collision-resistant, i.e. thprobability of
having two different objects whose hash collide can be neglected.
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or sending it encrypted, or sending it at the end of the
transmission along with a secure way for the receiver to check
that packets have not been excessively delayed while in transi
(indeed, if the verified subset is revealed once the symbols
have been received, it is too late to perform an attack). Hiding
the prel verif seedis therefore an easy task.
If the prel verif seed is hidden, it is still possible for the
attacker to hope that the verified subsetV will not intersect
with the non null bits of the corrupting codeword,e. The as-
sociated success probability depends on the Hamming weight
of e, Hw(e), and the size of the verified subsetNverif . The
Non Detection Probability (NDP) is therefore:
NDP =





Nverif−1
∏
i=0
(n − Hw(e) − i)
n − i
if Hw(e) ≤ n − Nverif
0 if Hw(e) > n − Nverif
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Fig. 6. Non Detection Probability (NDP) of the preliminary che k as a
function of the Hamming weight of the corrupting codeword for various
verification ratios (n=30,000, k=20,000).
Figure 6 shows that the non detection probability falls
quickly as the Hamming weight of the corrupting codeword
increases. For a verification ratio of5%, codewords of Ham-
ming weight larger than200 have a non-detection probability
lower than10−3, i.e. lower than the intrinsic non detection
probability of the VerifFEC preliminary check. Thus only the
codewords of weight lower that200 are a threat. This leads us
to the problem of finding ”Low Weight Codewords” (LWC).
2) Finding Low Weight Codewords:The attacker needs to
use LWC, that are known to exist with LDPC codes. The
attacker has two possibilities:
• he takes advantage of thes binary codewords extracted
from the transmitted packets;
• or he tries to find LWC from the code definition itself,
assuming he knows the LDPC code or is capable of
inferring this LDPC codes thanks to the received packets.
Let us consider the first possibility. Here the probability that
one of theses codewords be a LWC, or that a linear combina-
tion of theses codewords be a LWC, must be considered. Let
Nw be the number of codewords of weightw in the codeC.
This number can be approximated byNw ≃
Cwn
2n−k
. Assuming
that the s transmitted codewords are linearly independent,
they span a spaceT of dimensions and from this set of
codewords,2s different codewords can be produced. LetN≤w
be the number of codeword of weight lower or equal tow.
We can give an upper bound on this quantity:
N≤w ≃
w
∑
i=1
Cin
2n−k
≤
wCwn
2n−k
≤
w
2n−k
nw
w!
≤
wnw
2n−kww
The probability that a codeword of weight lower thanw
belong to this ensembleT is:
Ps,w =
Card(T )
Card(C)
∗ N≤w =
2s
2k
∗ N≤w ≤
wnw
2n−sww
This probability goes to zero when n goes to infinity. In our
casew (resp.s) is two (resp. one) order of magnitude smaller
than n, so the probability that a LWC be transmitted is very
small, and we can ignore them.
Let us consider now the second possibility. Finding a LWC
of a known LDPC code can be achieved with an exhaustive
search, or with less naive algorithms [1]. The complexity of
such algorithms can be an obstacle for attackers with bounded
computational capabilities. However, in order to obtain an
unconditional security, we assume in the remaining of this
work that the attacker can find a LWC if he knows the code.
This leads us to the problem of hiding the LDPC code.
3) Hiding the LDPC Code: Let us now focus on the
problem of hiding the code to the attacker. Changing the
code for each transmission is trivial with LDPC-staircase
codes, since these codes are are generated on the fly, using
a PRNG and a 32-bit seed that can be easily changed at each
transmission [12]. As for theprel verif seed(section V-B.1),
the seed used for the generation of the code can be easily
hidden.
However an attacker can also usecode recognition tech-
niques [13] to guess the code. The number of codewords
required for the recognition of LDPC codes in a noisy en-
vironment has been studied in [2] (in our case we assume
that the intercepted codewords do not contain any error). The
problem of recognizing an LDPC code is equivalent to finding
its parity check matrix. With LDPC-Staircase codes, the parity
check matrix isH = (H1|H2), whereH1 is a matrix with
regular row and column degrees andH2 is an(n−k)×(n−k)
staircase matrix. Letε be the set of such matrices. LetN1 be
the column degree andt = N1 R1−R be the row degree ofH1,
where R is the coding rate (these degrees are the result of
the [12] specifications for these codes).H1 defines a regular
bipartite graph withk left nodes of degreeN1 andn−k right
nodes of degreet. From [2](8) we have:
log2(card(ε)) ∼
N1(t − 1)
t
log2(n)
The necessary number of intercepted codewords for recovering
the code is of the orderlog2(n). Let assume thats is such
that s < N1(t−1)
t
log2(n) − C, where C is a constant. The
number of potential codes (i.e. the choices) is then of the ord r
2C and therefore the probability of picking the good code
(i.e. launching a successful attack) is2−C . By choosingC =
10, we make this non detection probability equal to2−10 =
0.00098, i.e. a little bit smaller than the VeriFEC preliminary
verification non detection probability (section V).
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Let us consider the same experimental conditions as in
section II-B.3. Sok = 20, 000 and R = 2/3, and it follows
that n = 30, 000 and t = 6 (N1 = 3 is the default with
LDPC staircase codes using iterative decoding). Therefore
N1(t−1)
t
log2(n)−C = 27.18, which means that it is sufficient
that s < 27 bits.
To conclude we can say that in practice, whenk = 20, 000
and R = 2/3, using symbols that are 3 bytes long, hiding
the LDPC code (i.e. the associated seed), and hiding the
prel verif seedprevent an attacker from attacking the prelim-
inary check of VeriFEC.
VI. RELATED WORKS
In [6], the authors introduce a scheme that corrects errors
and verifies symbols with a ”very high” probability when the
errors are random. Then they extend the work to address the
more complex problem of intelligent attacks by means of
code scrambling. If we consider only the first contribution,
the solution relies on the use of a specific decoding algorithm
for a so-called qSC channel (q-ary Symmetric Channel). This
solution completely differs from ours, that keeps the same
iterative decoding algorithm, over the same erasure channel,
but checks a subset of the source symbols after decoding. The
goals are different too, since VeriFEC does not try to correct
nor locate corruptions.
In [5] the authors present a system that allows to verify
on the fly the symbols before decoding. This verification
is done thanks to a homomorphic collision-resistant hash
function. An advantage of this solution is that only correct
symbols are used by the decoder. So the decoded object is
guaranteed not to be corrupted if decoding succeeds. But
this solution requires the use of addition overZq which
are much more expensive than the Exclusive-OR operations
used by LDPC-staircase codes. According to the authors, the
system adds around 500% processing time overhead. This
totally contradicts our goals of keeping the overhead as lowas
possible. Additionally, there is also a significant transmission
overhead since a hash must be transmitted for each source
symbol, whereas VeriFEC only requires the transmission of
{prel verif seed; prelhash;complhash}.
VII. C ONCLUSIONS
In this work we have shown that corruption detection capa-
bilities and source authentication can be efficiently addedto
the LDPC-staircase large block AL-FEC codes. The proposed
scheme, VeriFEC, checks the integrity of the decoded object
in two steps: the first step detects the vast majority of the
corruption with a very low computational cost, while the
second step finishes the verification to reach a 100% guaranty.
Thanks to comprehensive experiments, we found thatVer-
iFEC detects 99.86% of the most difficult random attacks
(where a single symbol is corrupted) for less than6% of the
computation overhead required for a complete signed hash of
the object, without any penalty in terms of erasure recovery
capabilities, the primary goal of AL-FEC codes. If the random
attack is less subtle (e.g. if several symbols are corrupted)
then the detection probability of the preliminary verification
significantly increases to reach almost 100%. The case of
intelligent attacks aiming to reduce the detection probability of
the preliminary check has been addressed. We demonstrated
that low weight codewords attacks can be prevented by re-
ducing the symbol size and by hiding a small number of key
parameters.
Globally, thanks to its low computation overhead, VeriFEC
can be of great help to mitigate random or intelligent denial
of service attacks. Additionally, if the threats only include
random attacks and if a high integrity probability is sufficient,
using the preliminary verification of VeriFEC only is mean-
ingful. However this is a particular case, not the general case.
This scheme can be generalized to other LDPC codes, on
condition these codes can be hidden instead of being totally
defined by the{n; k} tuple. It can also be used with Reed
Solomon codes, but as the decoding speed of these codes is
low compared to the integrity verification speed, the relative
gain will be smaller.
Finally, in future works we will study techniques to hide the
code to the potential attackers, for instance by adding known
noise to the transmitted symbols. One goal is to relax the
current constraint on the symbol size (s, see section V-B.3).
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